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Article 
 
Stumbling Towards Distr ibutive Justice 
 
Aileen E. Nowlan? 
 
Abstract 
 
The rapidly approaching end of the Kyoto Protocol and the vitriolic 
protests surrounding trade negotiations warm the heart of 
international law pessimists.  Although shared systems for prosperity 
demand global solutions to shared risks, international law is derided 
for an inability to distribute the resources necessary to create global 
prosperity and manage global risks.  This Article will demonstrate 
that such criticisms are misplaced.  The protests, the stalled 
negotiations, and the solutions all emerge from a rich tradition of 
distribution of resources in international law?one that is poorly 
understood, unfairly ignored, and replete with useful principles, 
frameworks, and successes.   
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Stumbling Towards Distr ibutive Justice 
 
Aileen E. Nowlan 
 
Introduction 
 
 When Japan released nuclear wastewater into the Pacific, other 
nations stepped in to help stem the flow from the crippled reactors.1  When 
the G20 addressed how to measure risk in the global financial system, it 
recommended technical assistance to countries with fragile financial 
monitoring.2  States have been offering and demanding resources from each 
other since time immemorial, either as punishment for the unsuccessful use 
of force or as reward for successful conquest.  As cooperation replaces 
outright coercion as an enforcer of globalization, collaboration spreads 
risks as fast as it shares prosperity.  The international community is 
struggling to invest in global public goods, reduce shared threats, preserve 
critical assets, and respond to moral obligations to moderate the harshest 
inequities.  At least some trans-border threats gain strength from systems of 
interconnection, such as air travel and global financial markets, that have 
created unprecedented wealth and a shared sense of community.  Nations 
must meet these threats through collective action because they are 
unwilling to accept the alternative of stemming the flow of capital, goods, 
and people.  Unfortunately, efforts to share risk and responsibility across 
borders have recently seemed to run aground.   
Work on distributional decision-making in international law tends 
to address the distribution of resources between only a few countries, such 
as those that share cross-border hydrocarbon or water resources.3  Tentative 
models of international law condition distribution on social relationships 
among nations and legitimacy gained as part of a norm community,4 on the 
                                                 
1 See Chizu Nomiyama & Shinichi Saoshiro, Japan seeks Russian help to end nuclear crisis, REUTERS 
(Apr. 5, 2011, 03:44), http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/04/04/idINIndia-56111120110404; Eric 
Talmadge & Mari Yamaguchi, US rushes freshwater to help Japan nuclear plant, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Mar. 25, 2011, 03:42), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/ 
2014593408_apasjapanearthquake.html. 
2 See G20 WORKING GROUP ON ENHANCING SOUND REGULATION AND STRENGTHENING 
TRANSPARENCY, FINAL REPORT 45 (2009) available at 
rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PublicationReport/Pdfs/20_010409.pdf.   
3 See Eve Vogel, Regionalization and Democratization Through International Law: Intertwined 
Jurisdictions, Scales and Politics in The Columbia River Treaty, 9 OR. REV. INT'L L. 337 (2007). 
4 See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 
INT?L ORG. 887 (1998); Kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in 
Latin America, 47 INT?L ORG. 411 (1993) (discussing norm communities and decreased salience of 
sovereignty).  
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opportunity to enshrine existing balances of power,5 or even on the need for 
cooperation.6  Writing in 1995, Thomas Franck commented on the 
motivation behind a newfound maturity of international law:  
 
Another reason for the exponential growth in international 
law in recent years is a prismatic change in the way in 
which humanity perceives itself.  The challenge of space 
exploration has joined with the depletion and degradation 
of ???? ???????? ???????????? ?? ?? ?? ??? ??????? ??? ???????
individuals and governments to think in terms of our 
common destiny: to counter humanity as a single gifted but 
greedy species, sharing a common, finite, and endangered 
speck of the universe.7 
 
This Article will demonstrate how, despite pessimism or silence 
from international law scholars, international law is already distributing 
resources among nations on a number of fronts.  This distributive capacity 
of international law is so successful and is used for such essential functions 
that it has gone unnoticed.  Moving away from the question of whether 
international law ????????????????????????????????? of what international law 
should do indicates the maturity of international law.8  The frameworks for 
distribution of resources have responded to each other over time, 
incorporating features that had staying power and rejecting others.  Despite 
the effective success of distribution in international law and the rich 
intellectual history of the evolution of the associated frameworks, very little 
is understood about why or how international law achieves distribution of 
resources.   
 Within a country, reducing a collective risk, sharing national 
patrimony, or investing in public goods is by no means easy.  However, the 
attempt at least benefits from a framework of debate?including notions of 
the minimum dignified existence of a citizen, the relative role of 
government and the private sector, cumulative responsibility for advantages 
or disadvantages passed on through generations?and from a community of 
accountability to carry out the resulting program.  The outcome from these 
debates within a country is greater or lesser distribution of resources in the 
form of money, opportunity, or knowledge.  
                                                 
5 See INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: DISCIPLINE AND DIVERSITY 59 (Tim Dunne et al., eds., 2d 
ed. 2010). 
6 See ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN 
TRANSITION ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
7 THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 6 (1995). 
8 Id. at 9.  
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It is even harder to imagine distribution of resources among 
nations; distribution of resources is not considered to be a strength of 
international law.  At the heart of the hardest fights about the global 
response to shared risk and reward is the question of distribution.  For 
example, who must pay for the relocation of citizens of drowning island 
nations?  When distribution must happen across borders, the international 
community lacks even the framework of debate.  Categories can get 
hopelessly muddled.  Even responsibility for the next generation is hard to 
understand when the next generation of Americans may have been born in 
the developing countries that trans-border distribution seeks to assist.  Eric 
Posner warns that:  
 
[W]e should not be surprised by the weakness and 
imperfection of treaties?such as the Kyoto Protocol?or 
the weaker version of Kyoto to which the United States 
would agree.  Treaties, unlike domestic law, must not only 
be welfare-maximizing; they must also be Pareto superior.  
The more states that are involved, and the more 
heterogeneous their positions, the weaker the treaties will 
be . . . . We should rarely observe treaties that redistribute 
wealth from one state to another.9 
 
Roberto Unger explains that the need to separate the market rules and 
arrangements guiding individual initiative from those governing 
??????????????????????????????????up against a limit, of efficacy as well as of 
????????? ????? ??? ???? ???? ??? ??????????10  Another skeptic writes that 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ways to untie parts 
???????????????????????????????????????????????11   
Line drawing exercises that are by no means simple in a domestic 
context become intractable when the lines govern the relationship between 
nations.  How would one divide the haves from the have-nots, when both 
groups exchange members so rapidly?  Even before populating such 
categories, critics counter that international law lacks a coherent theory of 
justice with which to direct the flow of resources.  Common international 
law mechanisms are based on simpler exertions, such as prohibiting 
                                                 
9 Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist Approach, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 528-529 (2006). 
Posner also argues that states are under no legal obligation to cooperate, although they might want to, in 
order to create global public goods. Id. at 522. 
10 ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FREE TRADE REIMAGINED: THE WORLD DIVISION OF LABOR AND 
THE METHOD OF ECONOMICS 93 (2007). 
11 DAVID G. VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE STRUGGLE TO SLOW GLOBAL 
WARMING 53 (2001). 
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dangerous acts,12 regulating risky activities,13 or compensating for past 
wrongs.14  Other political, practical, and cognitive challenges are certainly 
stumbling blocks to distribution.15 However, this Article will argue that the 
prevailing skepticism about the ability of international law to distribute 
hundreds of billions of dollars in costs and benefits among states is an 
unfounded impediment to the design of distributional systems on the scale 
needed to address global threats.  
Part I of this Article outlines the complex web of global risks and 
opportunities, which are multiplied by the substantive needs and demands 
for participation of myriad parties.  It describes the stunted distributive 
efforts thus far achieved through international law, and explains how the 
lack of understanding of how international law achieves distribution of 
resources is the primary impediment to deeper collective action.  Part II 
surveys a surprisingly rich field of distributive achievements in 
international law.  It analyzes how these frameworks draw on distinct kinds 
of justifications: compensation for past wrongs, necessity, investment in 
global public goods, and the common heritage of mankind.  It also 
uncovers how distributive frameworks based on compensation and 
necessity are uncontested in principle, but difficult to implement.  
Frameworks designed for investment in global public goods are effective 
over the long term if distribution is simple and direct, but complexities in 
the formula?such as taxonomies of countries, or unclear domestic 
bargaining positions?can overwhelm the investment rationale.  
Suggestions of distribution to reflect the common heritage of mankind 
prompt vociferous resistance from developed countries, which may 
nevertheless treat resources as if they are in trust.   
                                                 
12 See Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on their Destruction, opened for signature Dec. 3, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211; Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45; Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for signature Apr. 10, 1972, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163. 
13 See Convention on the Preservation of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and Other Matter, 
Dec. 29, 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120.  
14 See infra, text accompanying notes 87-94 on the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.  
15 In the climate change context, see, for example, Daniel Abebe & Jonathan S. Masur, International 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Problem, 50 VA. J. INT'L 
L. 325, 329-30 (2010?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
due to internal social and political dynamics?greater emissions are to be expected from Western 
China, which is much less developed than Eastern China and is a source of social unrest because of 
this); Rachel Brewster, Stepping Stone Or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism And National Climate 
Change Legislation, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 245, 247-49 (2010) (arguing that incremental national 
legislation may hinder rather than help development of a global climate change framework); Jedediah 
Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 
1122, 1135 (2010) (discussing difficulties in understanding risks, especially concerning a catastrophic 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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Part III elicits lessons from the survey of distributive frameworks 
to articulate patterns of distribution in international law.  Part III 
hypothesizes that compensation for wrongs and moral obligations both 
successfully motivate distribution in international law.  So too does an 
investment orientation, as long as the goal is clear and simply managed.  
The Conclusion confirms that designers of distributive frameworks 
incorporate prior reactions, both for and against, into subsequent iterations.  
States also react to distributive frameworks not only for what they mean for 
the goal at hand, but for the precedent they set on distribution in 
international law in general.  Given common goals, common opportunities, 
moral outrage, or individual responsibility, international law demonstrates 
a resilient ability to distribute resources across borders.  
 
I . A Sieve and a Shield: The Problem of Resources and Borders 
 
 The movement of resources across borders is not a new 
phenomenon.  The permeability of borders, and the nature of the risks and 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
struggle for the well-being of its citizens and an urgent need for a method 
of distribution by which international law may respond to trans-border 
challenges.  This Part will explain how the current impetus for the 
distribution of resources arises from a more complex web of threats and 
participants than any historical framework has been called on to address.  
Lacking a practical framework for implementation, scale, or a legitimating 
theory, international law has not yet adapted to meet the distribution 
challenge imposed by globalized threats.  This Part ends by describing how 
the lack of a legitimating theory of distribution is the cause of the 
intransigence in responding to globalized threats.  
 
A. Complex Web of Parties and Threats 
 
The challenge of distribution of resources across borders draws its 
urgency from increased threats to well-being and livelihood: disease, armed 
conflict, resource depletion, and environmental destruction that all cross 
borders with impunity.  The complexity of addressing global threats is 
multiplied by the increased political influence of nations emerging from 
under the foreign policy black-out curtain of colonial powers.  The 
complexity of demands for participation from developing nations and the 
urgency of global threats match the growth enjoyed from globalization like 
the teeth of a zipper.  
Almost every sphere of human existence is threatened by a force 
that crosses borders.  Diseases once found in the jungles of Central Africa 
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arrive in the United States.16  Zebra mussels arrive in ship ballasts and 
decimate native species in the Great Lakes.17  Amazonian farmers burn the 
last repositories of rare plants and animals in order to graze cattle.18  The 
????????? ??? ?????????? ?????? ???????? ???? ??????? ???????? ??? use anti-
terrorism laws to seize their assets,19 perhaps fearing a national security 
crisis arising from social unrest due to lost savings.  The threats from 
climate change alone include rising sea levels, intensifying weather events, 
declining forests and increasing desertification, loss of ecosystems and 
wildlife, drought and famine, poor health, and climate change refugees.20  
The perfection of one form of exploitation?such as hydraulic fracturing of 
natural gas?may hasten the end of such practices and the livelihoods that 
depend on them.21  
In the face of trans-border collective action problems, more nations 
are deman????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
raised by developing nations changes both the content of the distributive 
frameworks and the process of agreeing to them.22  When greater weight is 
given to the substantive needs of developing countries, the contents of 
proposed systems are measured against the redress they provide for 
historical claims for equity and justice.  The nature of these demands is 
incredibly diverse, because developing nations are divided across a 
dizzying variety of spectra: ?poor and rich states, poor and rich persons, 
parsimonious and spendthrift consumers,? and concern for present and 
future generations.23  
Demands for participation can be equally pressing.  When climate 
change negotiators in Copenhagen broke into a smaller group of twenty-
                                                 
16 Michael Specter, The Doomsday Strain, NEW YORKER (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????es] are 
enormous?not just for the Africans who kill and eat them but for billions of others throughout the 
world. If not for the consumption of bushmeat, AIDS would never have spread so insidiously across the 
planet. That pandemic, the most lethal of moder???????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
17  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Invasive Species, http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/invasive/ (last updated 
Nov. 20, 2009). 
18 APHRODITE SMAGADI, MEDICINAL BIOPROSPECTING: POLICY OPTIONS FOR ACCESS AND BENEFIT-
SHARING ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????? 
19 See Iceland to repay £2bn UK savings, BBC NEWS, June 6, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/business/8086997.stm (?Britain used anti-terrorism laws to freeze the assets of Icelandic banks, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
20 CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 20-33 (Chris Wold et. al eds., 2009). 
21 RONALD WRIGHT, A SHORT HISTORY OF PROGRESS 39 (2004) (writing about hunting in the Upper 
??????????????????????????? ???????????????????perfection of hunting spelled the end of hunting as a way 
??????????? 
22 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565, 1575 (2008). 
23 FRANCK, supra note 7, at 353. 
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eight nations in order to draft an Accord,24 the Conference of the Parties 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
procedural slight.25  In the absence of a global mechanism, local or regional 
initiatives are the source of carbon reduction commitments.26  These days, 
developing nations effectively insert demands for moral and practical 
consideration into negotiations on global threats.  Combined with the 
increased diversity and power of these threats, it is not hard to see why 
climate change negotiations have broken down. 
 
B. Stalled Distribution Efforts 
 
 Despite widespread understanding of the risks posed by global 
threats such as epidemics or systematic financial risks, as well as the 
dependence of global prosperity on interconnected systems, recent efforts 
to distribute resources to reduce risks and protect the drivers of well-being 
have stopped far short of their goals.  Most recently, negotiators who hoped 
to craft the next chapter to the Kyoto Protocol (which expires in 2012) went 
home to face a volley of commentary on just how much they had failed.  
Other long-term projects, such as global trade talks and the ratification of 
the International Seed Treaty or the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
have also lost momentum.  
 ??? ???? ???? ??? ???????? ??????????? ??????? ???????????? ??????
ministers, and eventually heads of state gathered to resolve the fate of the 
Protocol.  The Copenhagen Conference, with 40,000 attendees, was one of 
the largest environmental gatherings in history.  With one hundred heads of 
??????? ??? ???????????? ????????????? ????????? ???? ??? ?? ???????? ??????
agreement, but an Accord of ?????? ???? ??????????? ?????? ??????27  The 
???????????????????????-term goal of limiting climate change to no more 
????? ??? ??? ???????? ??? ???????? ???? ???????? ???? ????? ?????????? ????
developing country mitigation commitments or actions; and significant new 
?????????????????????28  ????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                 
24 See Lavanya Rajamani, The Making And Unmaking Of The Copenhagen Accord, 59 INT?L & COMP. 
L. Q. 824, 825 (2010).  
25 Daniel Bodansky, The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Post-Mortem, 104 AM. J. INT?L L. 
230, 231 (2010).  
26 See Kristina Robinson, Chicago Climate Exchange to Cease Operations, TRIPLEPUNDIT (Nov. 25, 
2010), http://www.triplepundit.com/2010/11/chicago-climate-exchange-cease-operations (commenting 
that Europe and California are the locations where carbon trading is active).  
27 Bodansky, supra note 25. 
28 Id. at 1. 
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FCCC, including all major emitters and economies, as well as those 
????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????29 
Nations at the subsequent Cancun Conference approved the 
financing target of $100 billion for developing nations along with a plan 
that would protect forests and develop methods to verify emissions 
reductions.30 Every country except Bolivia agreed to this proposal.31 
Climate change negotiators looked forward to Durban, South Africa, in 
2011, for the final chance to extend the Kyoto Protocol before it expires in 
2012.  The market for carbon reduction credits is already shrinking in the 
face of uncertainty about the next round of emissions reductions,32 and the 
window for achieving low-cost carbon abatement is closing rapidly.33  
Negotiators approached the conference in Durban without a resolution, let 
alone a road map towards resolution. 
The stalemate in Cancun came on the heels of similar speed bumps 
in implementing two specific framework agreements?the International 
Seed Treaty and the Convention on the Law of the Sea?and a deep freeze 
in negotiations on the world trade system.  The United States, in particular, 
has not signed the International Seed Treaty or the Convention on the Law 
of the Sea due to concerns about distributive justice, despite having taken 
an active role in the design of both frameworks.34  However, the United 
States has been advocating for the advance of the Doha Development 
Agenda, which replaced the Uruguay Round of global trade talks.  The 
meeting of GATT members in 1982, which launched the Uruguay Round 
of ?????????????????????????? ?????????????? ?????????35  In the early 1990s, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                 
29 Rajamani, supra note 24?????????? ????????????????????????????????????????he Accord neither 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
shared between States. It does not specify a benchmark from which the 2 degree C increase is to be 
?????????????????????????????????-indus?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????Id. at 827.  
30 Alex Morales et al., Global Warming Deal Decades Away as `Dysfunctional' U .S. Delays 
Commitment, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 13, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-
13/global-warming-deal-decades-away-as-dysfunctional-u-s-delays-commitment.html.  
31 Louise Gray, Cancun climate change summit: Bolivians dance to a different beat, but fail to derail 
the talks, TELEGRAPH, Dec. 12, 2010, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/climatechange/8197539/Cancun-climate-change-
summit-Bolivians-dance-to-a-different-beat-but-fail-to-derail-the-talks.html. 
32 Morales, supra note 30. 
33 MCKINSEY & CO., IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS ON CARBON ECONOMICS 11, Ex. 9 (2010) 
(noting that beginning abatement actions in 2020 would make it challenging to limit global warming to 
3 degrees Celsius). 
34 See infra text accompanying notes 204-208. 
35 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, The Uruguay Round, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2011) (noting 
that the talks were supposed to extend the trading system to trade in services, intellectual property, 
textiles, and agriculture).  
 No. 1 Stumbling Towards Distributive Justice 109 
?????????36  Talks in the Doha Development Agenda have struggled to 
reach agreement.  A global trade optimist describes how negotiations have 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????37  Topics that prompt truly bitter wrangling, such as 
the relationship between trade and investment, have been dropped from the 
Doha Agenda altogether.38   
  
C . The Impact of a Missing Theory of Distribution 
 
Many forces caused the timid, yet controversial proposals to 
replace the Kyoto Protocol, the downward spiral of global trade talks, and 
the stilted progress towards protecting biological diversity on the high seas.  
The most important cause is the lack of a theory of distribution to guide the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
no small measure to the lack of real agreement on burden sharing or who 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????39  
These debates are rooted in deeply-held beliefs about equity and 
distributional justice.40  International law scholars often discuss distributive 
justice in the context of other taxonomies to understand the question of 
how to equitably allocate resources.  These taxonomies include corrective 
justice,41 corrective equity, broadly conceived equity, and common heritage 
equity.42  ???????????? ?????????? ??? ???? ??? ??????43 ??????? ???? ?ommon 
????????? ??? ?????????44 ?????????? ??????45 ???????? ?????as the primary 
                                                 
36 Id.  
37 Richard Baldwin, Global trade talks: Doha is doable this year, E. ASIA FORUM (Feb. 1, 2011), 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/02/01/global-trade-talks-doha-is-doable-this-year/. 
38 ???? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
balance the interests of countries where foreign investment originates and where it is invested, 
coun?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, The Doha Agenda, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/doha1_e.htm#singapore (last visited Apr. 16, 
2011). Especially in the global trade context, re-examining the role of law in distribution is prompted 
partly by a failure of neoliberalism. A role for law in distribution is needed to improve the infrastructure 
of markets, correct market failures, provide social goods, and include the rule of law in the definition of 
development. THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 10-11 (David M. 
Trubek & Alvaros Santos eds., 2006).   
39 Daniel C. Esty, Breaking the Environmental Law Logjam: The International Dimension, 17 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 836, 852 (2008). 
40 E .g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 22????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the corrective justice model, because the consequence of tort-like thinking would be to force many 
people who have not acted wrongfully to provide a remedy to many people who have not been 
?????????????? 
41 See id. at 1572. 
42 FRANCK, supra note 7, at 57. 
43 See id. at 357. 
44 See id. at 358. 
45 Id. at 361. 
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?????????????46 or based on ability to pay.47  However, no consistent theory 
or school of distributive justice guides negotiations towards global 
solutions. 
The failure to renegotiate the Kyoto Protocol demonstrates the lack 
of a theory of distribution in international law.  As soon as the ink was dry 
on the Kyoto Protocol, it became apparent that the negotiated division of 
countries into Annex I and non-Annex I only set the stage for further 
battles over moral responsibility and financial liability, and could not be 
understood as proof that countries had reached a consensus on allocation.48  
The starting point of Kyoto was highly skewed: the United States emits 
24.5 metric tons of CO2 per capita, while India and China emit 1.9 and 3.9 
respectively.49  Although the West is responsible for the vast majority of 
cumulative emissions, China and the developing world are catching up.  
China has surpassed the United States as the greatest annual emitter.50  On 
top of this shifting foundation, the Kyoto Protocol overlaid property rights 
in the form of permits.51  The monetization of permits created value of 
about $2 trillion, and the political and economic consequences of the 
allocation of that value became apparent.52  One Kyoto skeptic argued that 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
that requires a completely novel form of international financing to succeed, 
???????????????????????? ??? ?????????? ????? ????????53  He predicts that 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????? ????????????? ??????????????????????????? ?????????????? ?????54  
                                                 
46 Id. at 361.  For example, a traditional market model would call for higher prices to be paid per unit 
(say clean water) for initial units based on their higher value to the user.  Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable 
Development and Private Global Governance, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2109, 2120-31 (2005).  
47 FRANCK, supra note 7, at 368. 
48 VICTOR, supra note 11, at 25.  Victor adds that the United States immediately began pressing for 
meaningful emissions reductions from developing countries; Senate resolutions in 1997 and 1998 called 
for specific commitments, and U.S. diplomats pressed for binding commitments from developing 
countries. Id. at 34. 
49 CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW, supra note 20, at 135. 
50 China overtakes U .S. in greenhouse gas emissions, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/business/worldbusiness/20iht-emit.1.6227564.html   
51 VICTOR, supra note 11, at 29.  
52 Id. at 50-51.  
53 Id. at 29. 
54  Id. Victor is skeptical about many aspects of international law. He argues that countries with skilled 
negotiators, such as Russia and Ukraine, get a better deal in their base years. Id. at 30. Distribution 
schemes would require long-term contracts with developing countries, which are unenforceable in 
international law. Id. at 38-39. Also, it is not possible to predict abatement costs and future emissions to 
??????????????????????????? Id. at 51. Eric Posner argues that countries might abide by long term 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
other in order to produce supranational (regional or global) public goods such as climate control and 
trade. There is no such obligation to cooperate because states have strong nonlegal incentives to 
cooperate, but there is an important regime governing the creation, interpretation, and enforcement of 
???????????????????supra note 9, at 522.  An agreement on distribution of permits, for example, would 
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Even without such skepticism, it is clear that Kyoto attempted to distribute 
value across borders without a sufficiently rigorous theory to justify this 
distribution.  
Posner and Sunstein have attempted to import a tort-based model 
of climate change liability in order to remedy this lack of a theory of 
distributive justice.  They argue that ????? ???????? ??????? ???????????????
fits the corrective justice model, because the consequence of tort-like 
thinking would be to force many people who have not acted wrongfully to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????55  Posner 
and Sunstein argue that climate change justice is rooted in corrective 
justice, which is understood to be reparations for past harm, and they raise 
questions of causality, of standing, and of the relative contributions of one 
household or the United States as a whole.56  They argue against collective 
responsibility imputed to Americans as a class.57  Unfortunately, as Posner 
and Sunstein themselves recognize, their tort analogy for corrective justice, 
even if technically correct in its mapping of questions of causality and 
group responsibility, does not reflect the current debate on climate change.  
Moreover, their suggestion is unlikely to resolve deeply divergent views of 
equity and distributional justice, regarding climate change or anything else, 
perhaps because it captures little of the ethical or moral arguments raised 
by a response to shared threats.58   
 Whether the problem is climate change, global trade, the loss of 
biodiversity, or loss of life to global pandemics, the solution required will 
be far more complex than bilateral resource sharing mechanisms in terms 
of geographic, industrial, and jurisdictional scope.59  Efforts to transplant 
                                                                                                                 
also require an agreement on the role of international law and its relation to the underlying goals of the 
international framework. See THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 38, at 9-10.  
55  Posner & Sunstein, supra note 22, at 1592. 
56  Id. at 1592-1600. 
57  Id. at 1593. The climate change problem, they argue, also fits poorly into traditional understandings 
of distributive justice.  Payments for carbon emission reduction are hardly justified by distributive 
justice as other forms of transfers might help poor people more, help the current poor more the future 
poor, or avoid the drawback that the price of carbon reduction may fall disproportionately on the United 
States poor. Id. at 1583-86.  
58 In the domestic context, the tort analogy has gained more traction.  The Supreme Court recently heard 
????????????????????????mpanies accused of emitting greenhouse gases can be held liable under public 
???????????????? Gil Keteltas, Supreme Court Grants Cert in Connecticut v. AEP, GLOBAL CLIMATE L. 
BLOG (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.globalclimatelaw.com/2010/12/articles/climate-change-
litigation/supreme-court-grants-cert-in-connecticut-v-aep/.  The Court will examine the Second 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
defenses.  See Connecticut v. Amer. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309  (2d Cir. 2009). In contrast, Franck 
emphasizes that assignment of liability for international environmental harm is both a moral and an 
economic decision.  See FRANCK, supra note 7, at 354.  
59 See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 3???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-scale 
autocracy and regional-??????????????????????????????????????????id. at 341 (discussing law, 
jurisdiction, geographic scale and democratization).  
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distributive frameworks from domestic law have been less than satisfying.  
Any number of arguments could be made about why these transplants have 
been rejected, such as the lack of consensus, or even a framework for 
consensus.  However, the bitter debates about culpability and liability for 
global risks are their own best evidence of a missing theory of distribution 
in international law.  As the survey of distributive frameworks in Part II 
reveals, the proper role of international law in distributing risks and 
rewards among nations has been of prime concern in negotiations; aversion 
to the distributive nature of various agreements has motivated the next 
iteration of global response.   
 
D . A Note on Measurement 
 
Before outlining the components of a theory of distribution and 
their application to international law, it is important to recognize that any 
theory of distribution must include a position on what measures are to be 
weighed in assessing the relative advantages conveyed by each theory.60  
Does a theory weigh income?  Wealth?  Longevity?  The rule of law?61  
What is the unit of analysis?  Is it an individual, a family, or a village?  
Gross National Income is a common proxy for well-being around the 
world.62  It may be supplemented by assessments of life expectancy,63 
gender equality,64 political inclusion,65 and the like.66  Amartya Sen argues 
for a measure of distributional equity based on opportunity as the freedom 
to achieve reasoned ends?the capability to do things that one has reason to 
value?rather than an assessment of primary goods, which are means at 
                                                 
60 See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 231 (2009). 
61 THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 38, at 9.  
62 See The World Bank, How We Classify Countries, available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications (last ?????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????? ???????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????? 
63 See CIA, The World Factbook, Country Comparison: Life Expectancy at Birth, available at  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2102rank.html (last visited Feb. 
26, 2011). 
64 See World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap, (2010) available at 
http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-gender-gap (measuring gender equality by economic 
participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political attainment).  
65 See CHANGING PATHS: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEW POLITICS OF INCLUSION 1 
(Peter P. Houtzager & Mick Moore eds., 2003).  
66 The new 2010 Human Development Index uses a composite of three factors: health (life expectancy 
at birth), knowledge (years of schooling) and income (purchasing power adjusted Gross National 
Income).  See United Nations Development Program, Human Development Index F requently Asked 
Questions, (2010), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_HDI_FAQs.pdf.  
 No. 1 Stumbling Towards Distributive Justice 113 
best.67  The selection of criteria and information determines the deficiencies 
that are deemed worthy of remedy. 
A measurement of advantage often focuses on what Sen would call 
the opportunity aspects of freedom, rather than the process aspects.68  
Participation in the discussions that lead to redistributive frameworks is one 
measure of advantage.  However, this Article focuses on how to justify the 
outcome of distributive arrangements and the relative opportunities that 
they create, rather than the means by which they were designed.  Sen calls 
this agnosticism towards means a narrow understanding of opportunity, the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????, or what one person 
receives in a distributive framework.69  Sen argues that, instead of 
considering freedom of choice to be unimportant, one should look to a 
??????????????? ?????????? ?????? ????????? ???? ????? ??? ?????? ?? ???????
reaches the culmination outcome.70  However, a narrow focus on outcome 
???????????? ????? ????????? ??????????? ??? ??? ??????????? ??? ?????????? ? ???
writes that  
 
[t]he fairness of international law . . . will be judged, first 
??? ???? ??????? ??? ?????? ???? ?????? ???????? ???? ??????????????
expectations of justifiable distribution of costs and 
benefits, and secondly by the extent to which the rules are 
made and applied in accordance with what the participants 
perceive as right process.71  
 
This Article does not take a position on the proper measure of advantage.  
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Gross National Happiness72 or by access to electricity,73 the choice of 
categories to measure will be dispositive for decisions about how to 
distribute. 
 
                                                 
67 SEN, supra note 60, at 234.  Sen goes on to argue that this is also true in the context of environmental 
sustainability, where we should focus on how the environment enables people to live the lives they 
value.  Id. at 248. Franck volunteers that the purposes of international environmental law are maximum 
sustainable development, redressing imbalances, and preserving and extending the good life. FRANCK, 
supra note 7, at 364. 
68 See SEN, supra note 60, at 228-29.  
69 Id. at 215. 
70 Id. at 230.  
71 See FRANCK, supra note 7, at 7.  For a discussion of the second factor ?legitimacy as procedural 
justice, and its role in determining the fairness of an allocative regime ? see id. at 25-26. 
72 See Andrew C. Revkin, A New Measure of Well-being from a Happy Little Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 4, 2005.  
73 See Samar Elsayed, Energy Access for Development, WORLD RES. INST. (May 12, 2005, 17:05 PM), 
available at http://earthtrends.wri.org/updates/node/339.  
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I I . Mapping Cur rent F rameworks 
 
 According to some scholars, the weakness or imperfection of 
redistributive treaties should be expected, but this expectation is not a 
complete or accurate description of the work being done by the distributive 
function of international law.74  The rapidly approaching end of the Kyoto 
Protocol and the vitriolic protests surrounding trade negotiations may warm 
the heart of international law pessimists.  However, the protests, the stalled 
negotiations, the damage, and the potential solutions all emerge from a rich 
tradition of distribution of resources in international law.  This tradition is 
poorly understood, unfairly ignored, and replete with useful principles, 
frameworks, and successes. 
A survey of frameworks for the distribution of resources through 
international law will shed some light on the distributive function of 
international law.75  These frameworks move resources between states to 
compensate for wrongs (via claims tribunals and diplomatic espousal), to 
meet an urgent need, to invest in the international system, and to recognize 
common heritage.  Some frameworks are motivated by two or more of 
these principles.  It may be surprising that so many resources are 
redistributed every day via international legal frameworks.  The fights 
about responsibility, culpability, and ability in the context of negotiations 
on climate change or other challenges help to clarify the as-yet ambiguous 
norms and practices guiding distribution in international law.  Perhaps 
overlooked in these heated debates is a tradition of distribution of resources 
through international law that offers at least some reasons for optimism.  
The following survey describes these distributive frameworks and traces 
how they have been constructed in dialogue with one another.  
                                                 
74 Broadly conceived, the environment, trade, and development are common targets of distributive 
frameworks.  See FRANCK, supra note 7??????????????????????????????????????????ealing with the 
perverse distributive effects of free trade in a particular situation [include] both distribution among 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????   UNGER, supra note 10, at 11.  
Unger organizes traditional objections to free trade into two categories: arguments for restraints on 
trade, and arguments based on distributive effects.  Id. at 10-11.  On distributive justice and trade, see 
also ALBINO BERRERA, GLOBALIZATION AND ECONOMIC ETHICS: DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (2007) (organizing arguments for distributive justice according to criteria of 
efficiency, need, and entitlement); ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN, ECONOMIC JUSTICE IN AN UNFAIR WORLD: 
TOWARD A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of mutual advantage, have played a role in shaping the international trade regime, even if less 
completely than one would wish if that arrangement were to be accepted as being j??????? 
75 International legal frameworks, much like domestic legal systems, have distributional effects. See, 
e.g., David Kennedy, The Rule of Law, Political Choices, and Development Common Sense, in THE 
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 38, at 95 (on the distributional consequences of 
legal systems, often described more clearly with economic rationale).  This is true even though 
development experts might like to think their recommendations, and the distributional consequences, 
were not political choices, but rather imperatives of their expertise.  Id. at 97.  
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 International law distributes resources through a variety of 
frameworks?some novel, such as the International Seed Treaty, and some, 
such as the Universal Postal Union, so well-established and effective that it 
is hard to imagine the world without them.  Compensation for wrongs, 
articulated through diplomatic espousal76 or claims tribunals, resembles 
compensation payments familiar from national systems.  Certain 
distributive frameworks justify themselves out of necessity, and respond to 
exigencies such as the HIV/AIDS crisis or the perceived ?odious debts? of 
highly indebted poor countries.  Investments in postal systems, 
telecommunications, biological diversity, and arms control provide global 
public goods?the infrastructure of the global system.  Finally, some 
frameworks call for a distribution of resources in favor of developing 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
as each of these is, some frameworks embody more than one governing 
principle.  Over the past hundred years, the global community has 
experimented with myriad frameworks for distribution of resources.  More 
recent attempts demonstrate admirable ambition, and have incited 
seemingly intractable challenges to their theoretical underpinnings and 
practical application.   
 
A. Compensation 
 
 Distribution occurs through international law to compensate for 
harm inflicted on private property rights.77 This compensation may come in 
the form of payments or restoration of property to an individual investor, 
and is often collected through means of diplomatic espousal. Although the 
amount in question may be hotly contested, the liability of states for some 
measure of compensation for harm to private property remains a time-
tested pillar of distribution in international law. 
For at least the past hundred years, the United States has supported 
?????????????? ??????? ??????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
protection on their behalf ???????????????????????????????????????78  In 2007 
???????????????????????? ????????????????????? ?????????????? ?????????????
                                                 
76 Diplomatic espousal is the mechanism by which a state persuades another state to provide 
compensation for a harm suffered by one of its nationals. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 902(2) (1987). 
77 This discussion does not touch on reparations exchanged between states in recognition of violations 
of public international law, or to amend for widespread losses in warfare.  See ISTVAN CASARHELYI, 
RESTITUTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (1964) (describing how Germany and her allies paid 
reparations to repair the losses caused by the war unleashed by them).  
78 2007 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW § 8, at 419. 
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requested diplomatic assistance with investment disputes,79 and the State 
Department office that handles investment claims and disputes is the 
largest office in the Department of State's Office of the Legal Adviser.80  
??????????? ????????? ??? ?????? ??? ???? ?????????? ????? ????? ?????? ??????
nationals are the owners of the shares of a foreign corporation may 
interpose on their behalf in case the corporation suffers wrong at the hands 
of a foreign state when those nationals have no remedy except through the 
??????????????????????????????????????81  Although countries might dispute 
the merits of the claims espoused through diplomatic means,82 there is little 
controversy about the right of a government to request compensation for 
harm to private property of their nationals.   
Although a victorious state used to enjoy the spoils of war,83 that 
ability is constrained nowadays by treaty and by customary international 
law.  The Hague Convention IV of 1907 articulated the legal obligation of 
restitution of private property seized in war.84 After World War I, Germany 
and her allies were obliged to restore private property damaged due to 
discriminatory measures.85  The treaties that ended World War II included 
distinct categories of claims: restoration of private property and reparations 
to states due to responsibility for war.86  
After the Iranian Revolution, Iran and the United States, 
negotiating through Algeria, agreed on a mechanism to adjudicate claims 
arising from losses to private property when those losses were attributable 
to the Iranian Government.87  The claims arrangement consisted of a 
Security Account out of which U.S. claimants would be paid and a Claims 
Tribunal to adjudicate those claims.88  
Although the need for some form of compensation for wrongs was 
not in dispute, the extent of the distribution required by the compensation 
????? ???? ????? ?????? ??????????? ? ???? ????????????? ?????????? ??? ?? ????????
                                                 
79 Hearing of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Serial No. 110-222, at 13 (July 17, 2008) (statement of 
David R. Nelson, U.S. Department of State). 
80 See The Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims and Investment Disputes 
(L/CID), U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3433.htm (last visited Sept 26, 2010). 
81 5 GREEN HAYWORD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 6 at 841 (1943).   
82 See?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????DIGEST OF 
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW § ***, at 489.   
83 CASARHELYI, supra note 77, at 29.  
84 Id. at 30. 
85 Id. at 35.  These obligations are distinct from the reparations due to the victorious states as a result of 
the war. 
86 Id. at 45.   
87 See RAHMATULLAH KHAN, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: CONTROVERSIES, CASES 
AND CONTRIBUTION 157 (1990) (excluded from the mandate were claims by the hostages, or acts not 
carried out by the Government).  
88 See THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE LAW OF STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY 11-12 (Richard B. Lillich et al. eds., 1998). 
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ob????????? ???? ??? ???????? ?????????? ?????????? ???? ???????????
?????????????? ?????? ?????????????? ??? ????????????????89  By the launch of 
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, however, that standard of compensation was 
under attack.90  The U.N. Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????? ?????? ??????????????? ??? ??????????? ????? ????????? ???? ??????????????
law.91  The U.N. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States of 1974 
dropped the reference ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????92  The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal is 
credited with reinforcing the principle of valuation as a going concern;93 
even in such a contentious dispute, the obligation of a state to compensate 
for wrongs was unchallenged.94  
 
B. Necessity 
 
 The principle of necessity motivates distribution of resources for 
old arrangements, such as sovereign debt and debt relief, and for novel 
arrangements, such as access to essential medicines.95  When faced with 
stark, alarming circumstances of human suffering, necessity motivates a 
rebalancing of resources to achieve morally acceptable outcomes.  Posner, 
??????? ??? ?????????? ??????????? ????? ?????? ????????? ??? ?????????????? ????
reflect altruistic concern for the well-being of people living across 
?????????96  The motivation of this distribution may be exacerbated by the 
odiousness of the origins of suffering?such as debts incurred by dictators 
for personal, rather than public, benefit?and may be mitigated somewhat 
by efficiency concerns in implementation. 
 
1. Sovereign Debt and Sovereign Investments 
 
                                                 
89 David P. Stewart, Compensation and Valuation Issues, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS 
TRIBUNAL, supra note 888, at 327. 
90 See KHAN, supra note 87, ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
profits); id. ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????
?????????????????Stewart, supra note 89, at 325. 
91 Stewart, supra note 89, at 330. 
92 Id. at 331. 
93 KHAN, supra note 87, at 218. 
94 ??? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
compensation, not future profits.  Id. at 231. 
95 See DOHA DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH ¶¶ 4-6 (Nov. 2001), 
available at http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/tripshealth.pdf (on compulsory licenses for 
essential medicines during national emergencies or in circumstances of extreme urgency).  
96 Posner, supra note 9, at 521. 
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 The practice of state-to-state lending is not at all new, although it 
has changed in form and in extent over the past hundred years.  States take 
on debt in exchange for foreign reserves with which to meet their domestic 
priorities, such as building infrastructure (under an ideal conception), to 
wage war, or to line the pockets of government officials (under an 
unfortunately common origin of sovereign debt obligations).  Although the 
restructuring of sovereign debt is a more recent addition to distribution 
under international law than compensation for wrongs, it similarly relies on 
arguments of moral force.  
 Sovereign debt is an interesting example of redistribution, as 
???????? ???? ????? ???? ???????? ??????? ??? ???????? ???????? ??? ???????????
?????????? ??? ???? ????? ??? ???????97  In the 1920s, sovereign debt primarily 
took the form of bonds.98  By the 1970s and 1980s, Western banks, looking 
for a profitable return on their extensive deposits from oil exporters, lent to 
?????????? ?????????? ???????? ???????? ??????????? ???????????99  Following 
this exuberance, syndicated loans were again replaced by bonds, due to the 
inability of developing countries to stay current on their extensive debt 
burdens.100  Lenders conventionally restructured ?????????? ????? ????
rearranging amortization schedules as well as writing off the debt 
principal.?101 However, ???? ??????? ??? ??????????? ????? ???????? ???????
through a combination of rescheduling the principal and compulsory new 
money infusions ha[d] ????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
meaning that the principals of the loans themselves were under threat.102 
 As debt burdens mounted towards the turn of the millennium, a 
campaign?started by Christian communities and embraced by a broad 
international coalition?called for debt relief for the poorest countries.103 
The result of this remarkably successful movement was debt relief 
commitments from the World Bank, IMF, and various countries.104  The 
United States House of Representatives passed the Debt Relief for Poverty 
Reduction Act, tying debt relief to reforms, poverty reduction, and 
sustainable development.105  Commentators borrowed heavily from Old 
                                                 
97 RODRIGO OLIVARES-CAMINAL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 105 (2009). 
98 Id.  
99 See AUGUST REINISCH, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEBTS 9 (1995). 
100 See OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 977, at 105.  Moreover, Reinisch explains that this debt crisis 
can be traced to oil price shocks, the poor state of the world economy, a sharp increase in interest rates 
in the 1980s, and capital flight by developing country elites.  See REINISCH, supra note 99, at 8-11.  
101 OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 977, at 106.   
102 Id. 
103 See Yale School of Management, The Campaign in the U .S., 
http://cases.som.yale.edu/jubilee/index.php?page=7&subMenu= (last visited May 29, 2011). 
104 See OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 977, at 159 (on the World Bank and IMF Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries initiative). 
105 Debt Relief for Poverty Reduction Act of 1999, H.R. 1095, H.R. REP. NO. 106-483 (1999).  
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Testament concepts of restoration and a fresh start.106  In addition to the 
religious connotation, part of the motivation for debt relief was a reaction 
against ???????????????107  The idea of odious debts was originally a means 
for repudiating debt under circumstances of state succession, when the debt 
???? ????????? ??? ?? ??????????? ??????????? ???? citizens had not benefited 
from the loans.108  The idea of odious debts has been expanded to include 
??????? ??????????????? ????????109 ???????????????????????????,????????????
incurred by non?democratic, corrupt governments against the interests of 
the people who must pay them back.110  If sovereign debts have been one of 
the largest sources of foreign capital for developing countries, debt relief 
was one of the most successful redistributive efforts in recent memory.111  
It is all the more surprising that the debt relief movement, which was 
almost entirely justified as a moral or religious obligation on the part of 
developed countries, was so successful, given resistance to previous 
distributive efforts based on arguments for the common heritage of 
mankind.112  
 
2. Access to Essential Medicines 
 
Although most pharmaceutical products were not designed with the 
needs of poor people in mind, existing medicines could prevent some of the 
eighteen million deaths a year from causes such as nutritional defects, 
communicable diseases, and maternal and perinatal conditions.113  The fact 
that generic manufacturers could make these medicines affordable, but are 
prevented from doing so by intellectual property regimes,114 has prompted 
                                                 
106 Debt Relief for Poverty Reduction Act: Hearing on H.R. 1095 Before the H. Comm. on Banking and 
F inancial Services, 106th Cong. 2 (1999) (statement of James A. Leach, Chairman).  
107 See OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 977, at 169. 
108 See Odette Lienau, Who Is the "Sovereign" in Sovereign Debt?: Reinterpreting A Rule-of-Law 
Framework from the Early Twentieth Century, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 63, 65 (2008). 
109 See OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 977, at 172. 
110 See id. at 183; Joseph Kahn, Leaders in Congress Agree to Debt Relief for Poor Nations, N.Y. 
TIMES?????????????????????????????????????ng nations have been pressing for donor nations to forgive 
past debts, arguing that many of the debts were incurred by earlier -- and often corrupt -- governments 
????? ??????????????? 
111 See Joshua William Busby, Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry: Jubilee 2000, Debt Relief, and Moral 
Action in International Politics, 51 INT?L STUD. Q????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
narrow material interests, apparently at the behest of a transnational advocacy group . . . . Two 
economists called the campaign ???????????? ?????????????????????????-country movement aimed at 
???????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????? 
112 See discussion infra, Section III.D. 
113 Thomas Pogge et al., Access to Essential Medicines: Public Health and International Law, in 
INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH: PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 4-5 
(Thomas Pogge et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter INCENTIVES]. 
114 Effectively, the grace period during which developing countries can get cheaper generics without 
violating TRIPS obligations on patent licenses has been extended to January, 2016.  See Andrew D. 
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concerted calls for a rebalancing of international intellectual property law 
away from developed country drug companies and in favor of developing 
country poor people.  
Developing countries originally agreed to abide by the rigorous 
protections of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(?TRIPS???????????????????????????????????????????[countries] in other areas 
???????????????????????????????????????????115  Article 31 of TRIPS allows a 
country, ???????? ???? ??????? ????????? ???????, to manufacture or import a 
medicine, as long as the rights holder is paid adequate compensation and 
the use is predominantly for the domestic market.  The developing country 
is also required to try to obtain a voluntary license, except in extreme 
emergencies.116  This provision is not nearly as generous as it seems, as 
most poor countries lack manufacturing capabilities and would have to 
import generics.  In order for the generics to be truly low cost, they would 
need to be manufactured under compulsory license, in, for example, 
Canada.  But in order for Canada to obtain that compulsory license, the 
?????????????? ??? ????????? ???? ????????? ????????????????? ????? ???????? ??
Catch-22 which renders the entire system absurd.117 
Responding to the pressures to eliminate this absurdity, the WTO 
in August 2003 decided that any member country could export medicines 
subject to a compulsory license, but with some protections.118  This 
agreement, incorporated into TRIPS, was only supported by 20 countries 
and the EU.119  It has been criticized as ineffective and many drug-
exporting countries have not passed implementing legislation on 
compulsory licenses.120  The first, and so far only, export of drugs under 
compulsory license took place from Canada to Rwanda in September 
2008.121  Although halting and modest in its achievements to date, the 
access to essential medicines regime, motivated by urgent need in 
developing countries, represents an international legal framework to 
distribute the gains from intellectual property in favor of developing 
countries. 
 
                                                                                                                 
Mitchell & Tania Voon, The TRIPS Waiver as a Recognition of Public Health Concerns in the WTO, in 
INCENTIVES, supra note 113, at 62.  However, prior to TRIPS the US had put pressure on developing 
countries to improve IP regimes, under threat of WTO sanctions.  See APHRODITE SMAGADI, 
MEDICINAL BIOPROSPECTING: POLICY OPTIONS FOR ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING 100 (2009). 
115 Elizabeth Siew-Kuan Ng, Global Health and Development: Patents and Public Interest, in 
INCENTIVES, supra note 1133, at 104.  
116 Mitchell & Voon, supra note 1144, at 60.  
117 Id. at 61. 
118 INCENTIVES, supra note 1133, at 11. 
119 Id. at 12. 
120 Id. 
121 Mitchell & Voon, supra note 1144, at 56. 
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C . Investments in Global Public Goods 
 
 Among the oldest distributive frameworks in international law are 
the ones designed to provide global public goods.  The Universal Postal 
Union, one of the oldest international institutions, has achieved its goal of 
enabling global postal communication with such efficacy over the past 
hundred years that it is often overlooked as an example of distribution in 
international law.  Additionally, international efforts to combat small arms 
violence have distributed significant resources to vulnerable countries.  
However, newer investments in global public goods, such as the 
preservation of biological diversity in general, or seeds in particular, may 
be short of the resources required to carry out their mandates and are 
somewhat more fraught with disputes.  The Convention on Biological 
Diversity organizes resources and responsibilities in bilateral arrangements 
between host countries and investors.  Responding perhaps to the fifteen 
years of work it took the Working Group of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity to issue guidelines on access and benefits sharing, the 
International Seed treaty instead employs a common fund out of which 
benefits will be shared.  
 
1. Universal Postal Union 
 
The Universal Postal Union (?UPU?) is one of the oldest 
international institutions and a longstanding mechanism for distribution in 
international law.  It was established by the Treaty of Berne on October 9, 
1874, and entered into force on July 1, 1875.122  The UPU was designed to 
improve the efficiency and lower the cost of postal communications.  
Previously, one would have had to affix domestic postage, transit fees, and 
terminal dues for the destination country, calculated based on different 
currencies and units of weight.123 The UPU introduced three substantial 
innovations: (1) single postal territory and freedom of transit; (2) universal 
service; and (3) a unified system for postal charges, transit charges, and 
terminal dues.124   
The UPU enables international mail flows by shifting postal 
revenues from developed countries to developing ones.  The UPU separates 
developed and developing countries into two systems.  The target system 
covers international mail flows between developed countries, and the 
??????????? ??????? ??????? ????????????al mail flows to, from and between 
                                                 
122 Mira Burri, Working Paper, International Regulation of Postal Communications (Jan. 22, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1271786.  
123 Id. at 2.  
124 Id. ¶¶ 11-18. 
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developing countries, following the classification of the United Nations 
???????????? ???????????125  Developing countries receive preferential 
rates under this system.126   
In 2004, the UPU Congress agreed to design a system whereby the 
countries in the transition system could join the target system.  It also 
vastly complicated the methodology for calculating preferential terminal 
dues.127  Proposals offer a complex formula for setting terminal dues based 
on gross national income, per letter delivery cost, macroeconomics, and a 
country??? ?????? as a small-island developing state or landlocked 
developing state (if applicable).128  At about the same time as the Kyoto 
Protocol was heavily criticized129 for imposing obligations based on a hard 
line between developing or developed countries,130 the UPU was also 
eschewing binary categories to drive distribution.    
 
2. Arms Control and Security 
 
The United Nations Programme of Action (?PoA?) is the 
organizing framework for small arms and light weapons (?SALW?) 
assistance.  The plague of SALW destabilizes fragile states, emboldens 
drug dealers and terrorists, and threatens the lives of soldiers and police 
trying to enforce order.  SALW pass from conflict to conflict without 
losing their deadly accuracy; working rifles from World War I have been 
seized from the Afghan Taliban.  In order to reduce the threat from SALW, 
international assistance is part of all international and most regional small 
arms and light weapons policy frameworks.131  The PoA asks that states 
???????????????????? ?????????????????????? ?????????? ?????????????? ??????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????132  From 2001 through 
                                                 
125 Id. ¶ 18.   
126 Id.   
127 Under the current terminal dues system: Least developed countries (LDCs) receive 16.5% of their 
inward [terminal dues] from all other classes of countries. TRAC 1 countries (former DCs) pay 16.5% 
to LDCs and receive 8% from industrialized countries (ICs). Net contributor countries (NCCs) pay 
16.5% to LDCs and receive 1% from ICs. ICs receive no payments but pay 1% to NCCs, 8% to DCs 
and 16.5% to LDCs. 
UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION, THE UPU GLOBAL TERMINAL DUES SYSTEM PROPOSAL, Berne, ¶ 2 (21-22 
Jan. 2008) [hereinafter TERMINAL DUES PROPOSAL]. 
128 UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION, COUNTRY CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY FOR THE FUTURE TERMINAL 
DUES SYSTEM, CONGRÈS?Doc 19.Rev 1.Annexe 1, 24th Congress. 
129 See supra, text accompanying note 48.  
130 ?????????????????????????I?????????-Annex I????See infra, text accompanying note 213. 
131 KELLY MAZE, UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, SEARCHING FOR AID 
EFFECTIVENESS IN SMALL ARMS ASSISTANCE 7 (2010). 
132 Id. at 8 (quoting the PoA § 3 ¶ b).  
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
?????????????????133   
 
3. Convention on Biological Diversity 
 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (?CBD?) of 1992 was 
intended to preserve biological diversity, most of which is found in 
developing countries, so that it may be used for food and medicinal 
purposes by rich and poor countries alike.  Without the CBD, intellectual 
property regimes grant temporary exclusivity over biological resources to 
whomever can isolate and purify them, which is most likely not the 
developing countries.134 This imbalance in access to biological diversity 
and ability to profit motivates the innovative benefits-sharing mechanism 
of the CBD. 
The CBD?? goals are ?????????????????????????????????????????????
sharing of benefits, part of which is appropriate access and appropriate 
technology transfe???135  Article 3 emphasizes sovereign rights over natural 
resources within a jurisdiction, a provision designed specifically to dispel 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????136  Article 15 requires biodiversity-rich countries to facilitate 
access to genetic resources.  Article 16 provides a reward of technology 
????????? ??? ?????????????? ???? ????? ???????? ???? ?????????? ??? ??? ??? ?????????
parties to facilitate the exchange of information, promote technological and 
scientific cooperation, and provide for the treatment of biotechnology and 
????????????? ??? ??????????137  Article 19, in particular, ?clearly announces 
that in exchange for access to its biodiversity, the developing world will 
receive a fair and equitable portion of the benefits that the North yields 
????????????????138 
 Early implementation of the access and benefits-sharing provisions 
was not encouraging.  Costa Rica was the first country to exchange access 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
                                                 
133 Id. at 20. 
134 See United Nations Framework Convention on Biological Diversity art. 3, Jun. 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 
818; Aphrodite Smagadi, Analysis of the Objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity: Their 
Interrelation and Implementation Guidance for Access and Benefit Sharing, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
243, 244-46, 275, 281 (2006) (noting that the question of equitable sharing of the benefits of biological 
diversity parallels the debate on distributive claims of developing countries for maritime resources.  
Furthermore, countries are free under the CBD to interpret access and benefit sharing; countries 
manifest concepts of equity based on procedural, retributive, and distributive principles). 
135 See SMAGADI, supra note 1144, at 39. 
136 FIONA MCCONNELL, THE BIODIVERSITY CONVENTION: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY 72 (1996). 
137 See SMAGADI, supra note 1144, at 40. 
138 Id. 
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1991 between Merck and a national conservation organization, INBIO.139  
INBIO negotiated fourteen ??????????? ??????? ??? ?????? ?? ???? ????? ???
?????????????? ?????????? ????? ???? ??????? ???? ??? ??? ????? ???????????? ????
controlling of the process o?? ??????????????????? ??????????????140  Mexico 
signed four agreements, three of which ??????? ?????????? ??????????? ??????
??????????????? ???? ???????????? ??????? ????????????????141  The one 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????142   
 Fleshing out the practical application of the benefits sharing 
provision of the CBD took fifteen years and nine meetings of a dedicated 
Working Group.143  The outcome of this work was presented in October 
2010 to the Conference of Parties in Nagoya, Japan.  The Nagoya Protocol 
on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising From Their Utilization envisions bilateral exchanges on 
?????????? ??????? ?????? of access to resources for monetary and non-
monetary benefits.144  The Protocol emphasizes consideration of women 
and indigenous communities in decision-making and sharing of benefits 
under these arrangements.  It provides no more guidance as to how such 
?????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
4. International Seed Treaty 
 
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources (?Seed 
Treaty?) entered into force on June 29, 2004 and sought ??? ?ensure 
conservation and sustainable management of plant genetic resources for 
food and agriculture, as well as the fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
???????? ????? ?????? ?????145  It replaced the International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources of 1983, which stated that all plant germplasm 
was the common heritage of mankind.146  Like the CBD, the Seed Treaty 
                                                 
139 Stephen R. Brush & Santiago Carrizosa, Implementation Pathways, in ACCESSING BIODIVERSITY 
AND SHARING THE BENEFITS: LESSONS FROM IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL 
DIVERSITY, IUCN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW PAPER NO. 54, at 68 (Santiago Carrizosa et al. 
eds., 1994). 
140 Id. at 69.  
141 Id. at 71. 
142 Id. at 72. 
143 Working Group on Access and Benefits Sharing, http://www.cbd.int/abs/wgabs/ (last updated Dec. 
9, 2010). 
144 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
Arising From Their Utilization art. 5(1).  
145 See SMAGADI, supra note 1144, at 36. 
146 Id. at 34.   
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trades compensation for efforts to conserve and manage seed stocks.147  
The Seed Treaty  
 
covers all genetic material for food and agriculture by 
specifically putting in place a multilateral system to 
facilitate access to 64 essential crops and their varieties. 
Parties deal directly with the system and not with each 
other; and benefit-sharing arrangements are possible only 
in the context of the genetic resources listed in the 
multilateral system.148 
 
In terms of benefits sharing, it ?calls for those parties that use material 
accessed from the multilateral system and create commercial value from 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????149  These benefits 
are administered through a common fund, via a Governing Body.150  The 
Seed Treaty appears to be trying to avoid the transaction costs inherent in 
the bilateral relationships envisaged by the CBD, but has not done nearly as 
????? ????? ??? ???? ???? ??? ???? ???????? ??? ??????????? ????? ??? ???????????
??????? ?????151  
 
D . Common heritage of mankind 
 
 ??????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ??CHM?) has 
????? ??????? ????? ??? ???? ????? ?????????????? ????????????? ??? ???????
??????????????????????152  At its core, CHM seeks to remedy the disparities 
between developed and developing nations through equitable sharing of 
resources.153  The common heritage of mankind builds on the concept of 
res nullius??????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ????????? ???? ????????? ???
appropriation?and res communis?a source of resources which may not 
be appropriated, although the resources themselves may be.154  CMH adds 
to res communis the notion of redistribution??? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????
?????????????????????????? ????????????155  Resources subject to equitable 
                                                 
147 See id. at 65. 
148 Id. at 97. 
149 Id. at 98. 
150 See id. 
151 See infra subsection II.C.3.  
152 KEMAL BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
7 (1998). 
153 Id. at 96-97.  
154 EMILIO J. SAHURIE, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ANTARCTICA 368-369 (1992). 
155 Id. at 369; see also BASLAR, supra note 152, at 43 (on benefits sharing as an addition to res 
communis). 
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sharing include material and tangible benefits, as well as knowledge and 
technology.156 At the beginning, equitable sharing had only been employed 
in the context of exploitation of resources;157 ???? ?????? ?????????? ????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
burden-sharing to the common heritage framework.158 
The concept of CHM was first espoused in a tentative fashion in 
the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 
????????????????????????????????????????159  It was sent to the forefront in 
the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of the States on the Moon 
???????????????????????????????????????????160  The treatment of common 
resources has been articulated in the most detail, and made subject to the 
most resistance, in negotiations over the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention.161 
After the euphoria of the New International Economic Order 
????????? ??????? ???????????? ???? ?????????? ??????????? ??????? ??????????
have quieted.  CHM was specifically rejected in both the CBD of 1992 and 
the Seed Treaty of 2004.162 Indeed, these international legal frameworks, 
although arguably drawn from a shared concern with biodiversity as a 
common heritage, may have responded to the resistance to the concept of 
CHM.  States Parties to the Antarctica Treaty System, in order to fend off a 
push in the 1980s to extend the concept of CHM to Antarctica, may have 
preserved their control over their treaties by acting as though Antarctica 
was being held in common, albeit without admitting as much. 
 
1. Outer Space and Moon Treaties 
 
The Outer Space Treaty was opened for signature less than six 
years after the Soviet Union put a man into space, and less than ten years 
after the launch of Sputnik.  One hundred nations, including the United 
                                                 
156 BASLAR, supra note 1522, at 98. 
157 Id. at 99. 
158 Id. at 100. 
159 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activity of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 3, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. 
160 Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, GA Res. 34/68, 
UN GAOR, Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A34/46 (1979).  
161 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3.  Also, in 1982 
Malaysia and other developing nations called for the concept of CHM to be applied in Antarctica.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 188-190. 
162 See infra text accompanying notes 136 (CBD) and 146 (Seed Treaty).    
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States and all other spacefaring nations, have ratified the treaty.163  The 
treaty requires that the  
 
exploration and use of outer space . . . be carried out for the 
benefit and interests of all countries . . . and shall be the 
????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ???????? ? further provides that 
????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
states without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of 
equality and in accordance with international law . . . 
???????? ???????? ???? ????????? ?????? ?? ?? ?? ??? ???? ???????? ???
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means 
?????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
so-??????? ???????? ??????????? ?????????? ???? ????-
??????????????????????????164 
 
?????? ?????????????????? ?????????????????????? ?????????????????laims of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????165  
 As activities in space become more privately-run, commercial 
endeavours, rather than nationalist demonstrations of scientific prowess, 
the interpretation of the common interest and non-appropriation clauses of 
the Outer Space Treaty have become more salient.166  Non-spacefaring 
nations argue that any benefits from space should be equitably distributed, 
?????? ???????????? ???????? ???????? ????? ????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??? ????
optimism inherent in space exploration and places no limitations on them 
????????????167  Along the same lines, non-spacefaring nations argue that 
any mining of outer space would violate the non-appropriation principle.168  
As private enterprises contemplate profit-making in space, scholars debate 
whether the non-appropriation principle only prohibits national 
appropriation (leaving private ownership alone),169 or whether the freedom 
                                                 
163 See U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs, United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space and 
Other Related General Assembly Resolutions, add. at 8-16, U.N. Doc. 
ST/SPACE/11/Rev.1/Add.1/Rev.1 (Jan. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Outer Space]. 
164 Captain Michael R. Hoversten, U .S. National Security And Government Regulation Of Commercial 
Remote Sensing F rom Outer Space, 50 A.F. L. REV. 253, 261 (2001). 
165 Adam G. Quinn, Note, The New Age Of Space Law: The Outer Space Treaty And The 
Weaponization Of Space, 17 MINN. J. INT'L L. 475, 480 (2008). 
166 See e.g., Jonathan Thomas, Note, Privatization Of Space Ventures: Proposing A Proven Regulatory 
Theory For Future Extraterrestrial Appropriation, 1 INT'L L. & MGMT. REV. 191 (2005) (on roadblocks 
established by current treaties on privatization of outer space ventures).  
167 Quinn, supra note 1655, at 480.  
168 Id. at 481. 
169 Zach Meyer, Private Commercialization of Space in an International Regime: A Proposal for A 
Space District, 30 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 241, 252 (2010). 
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principle would preclude the right to exclude others through any sort of 
private property rights.170  
The Moon Treaty has none of the ambiguity of the Outer Space 
Treaty.  It has also been ratified by only thirteen nations, none of which 
currently have the capability of space travel.171 The Moon Treaty  
 
establishes that all resources outside the earth are the 
???????? ????????? ???????????? ???? ????? ??? ???????? ???????
public or private can exclusively own any space resource, 
???? ????? ?????? ????? ??? ??????????? ????????? ??? ???? ??????
parties in the benefits derived from space resources, taking 
into consideration the needs of developing countries . . . . 
Although the Moon Treaty allows parties to retain 
ownership of the equipment, vehicles and installations . . . 
there is no right to exclude because Article XV requires 
that all vehicles, installations and equipment shall be open 
to use by all other parties.172  
 
 Developing nations argued that access to Moon resources should 
be approved by a majority, with each nation having one vote.173  Baslar 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of ma??????????? ?????????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ????????174 He adds that 
????? ?????? ???????? ???? ????????? ??????? ???? ?????? ??????? ??? ???? ?????
when a clear Third World majority at the United Nations was thought to be 
?????????????????-????????????????????????????????????????? ?????175 
The United States responded to this attempt by calling it 
??????????????? ?????????? ??????????? ??? ???? ?????? ???????176  Companies 
????? ???? ?????????? ???? ???????? ??? ?? ??????-World drive to frustrate 
??????????????-won technological supremacy.?177  The United States was 
especially adverse to elements of the treaty that were hostile to U.S. private 
enterprise, such as the provision that lunar facilities would be open to 
                                                 
170 David Collins, E fficient Allocation of Real Property Rights on the Planet Mars, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 201, 204 (2008). 
171 See Outer Space, supra note 163 (France has signed but not ratified the Moon Treaty). 
172 Collins, supra note 1700, at 204-5. 
173 BASLAR, supra note 1522, at 164. 
174 Id. at 161. 
175 Id. at 164-65. Much like the Law of the Sea Convention, developing country mineral exporters were 
trying to head off a situation where minerals were supplied from the moon or other celestial bodies, 
worsening their international bargaining power.  
176 Id. at 161. 
177 Id. at 164. 
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inspection by any government that wished.178  They accurately, although 
with dis?????? ?????????????? ???? ??????? ??? ?? ??????? ?????? ??????? ????
massive redistribution of wealth so as ultimately to equate the economic 
????????? ??? ???? ???? ?????????????179  Given the marked difference in 
support for the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty, and their textual 
differences, it is probably a stretch to read CHM into the Outer Space 
Treaty.  More interesting for the purposes of understanding the distributive 
function of international law is the vociferous opposition to any obligation 
imposed on developed countries by the CHM framework.  
 
2. Antarctic Treaty System 
 
The Antarctic treaty regime represents a powerful and somewhat 
under-appreciated accomplishment of peace-making in international law, 
and the sharing of resources in particular.  The aspiration that Antarctica 
not be a source of international discord was a very weighty goal in the late 
1950s.180  Despite ambiguities in treaty documents, it enabled thirty years 
of successful cooperation in scientific research, while wars were fought by 
the same parties elsewhere.181  Britain and Argentina negotiated in 1982 in 
good faith over Antarctica while on the brink of war in the Falklands.182  
Both the United States and Russia committed to conducting no military 
actions in Antarctica, which effected a complete demilitarisation of sizable 
territory of military value during the Cold War.183  
The Antarctic treaty regime is comprised of four treaties: (1) the 
1959 Antarctic Treaty covering general prohibition of military activities 
and nuclear dumping;184 (2) the 1964 Brussels Agreed Measures for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora;185 (3) the 1972 Convention for 
the Conservation of Antarctic Seals; and (4) the 1980 Convention of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources.186  The Antarctic treaty regime does 
                                                 
178 Id. at 162; see also Quinn, supra note 1655, at 482-???????? ?????????????????????????????????
unambiguously deny property rights in outer space to both sovereign nations a???????????????????? 
179 BASLAR, supra note 1522, at 165. 
180 Christopher D. Beeby, The Antarctic Treaty System: Goals, Performance, and Impact, in THE 
ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM IN WORLD POLITICS 4, 5 (Arnfinn Jørgensen-Dahl & Willy Østreng eds., 
1991). 
181 Joe Verhoeven, General Introduction, in THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
11, 11 (Joe Verhoeven et al. eds., 1992). 
182 Beeby, supra note 1800, at 4.  
183 Id. at 5-6. 
184 Antarctic Treaty arts. 1,5, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.  
185 Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, June 2, 1964, 17 U.S.T. 991. 
186 Conference on the Convention of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, July, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 841 
(1980).  A fifth treaty, the Wellington Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities, was designed to govern mineral exploitation. See Antarctic Treaty Special Consultative 
Meeting on Antarctic Mineral Resources: Final Act and Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic 
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not seek to resolve the multiple overlapping claims to sovereignty over 
Antarctic territory.187  
Malaysia, working in the United Nations General Assembly in 
1982, extended the idea of the CHM, drawn from the Law of the Sea, to 
Antarctica.188  It complained that an exclusive club of twenty-five countries 
was deciding the fate of Antarctica?a territory that should be organized 
for the benefit of all.189  Resisting the notion of global governance, the 
parties to the Antarctica Treaty System worked for decades to get 
Antarctica off the United Nations agenda.  Much of the criticism faded 
away after the Wellington Convention was abandoned.190  Despite rejecting 
in principle the concept that Antarctica should be governed in common or 
that its resources should be shared among countries without regard to 
technical ability or a sovereign claim, parties to the Antarctic Treaty 
System appear to have effectively organized themselves almost as stewards 
of a global trust.  Even if conservation measures are not as effective as 
could be hoped, parties have avoided?at least on land?appropriating 
resources to themselves. 
 
3. Law of the Sea 
 
 The law of the sea has traditionally been understood as a tension 
between the rights of coastal states to exploit natural resources off their 
shores and the right of maritime states to freedom of navigation.  But newly 
decolonized countries shifted the debate from one limiting the expansion of 
national jurisdiction in order to protect freedom of navigation, to one about 
how the seas could be utilized ?for the economic benefit of the 
?????????????? ?????????? ??? ?? ??????? by means of ?????????????? ??? ????
??????????????????????????????????????191  The Law of the Sea agreement 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????192  
                                                                                                                 
Mineral Resource Activities, May, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 868 (1988). In the face of strong protests, the 
Wellington Convention was stillborn, as it was immediately rejected by the same countries that had just 
negotiated it and who now claimed a desire to radically protect the environment. See Verhoeven, supra 
note 1811, at 12. 
187 Beeby, supra note 1800, at 5. 
188 Rajmah Hussain, The Antarctic: Common Heritage of Mankind?, in THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note E r ror! Bookmar k not defined.81, at 89.  
189 Id. at 91.  
190 Marie Jacobsson, The Antarctic Treaty System: Legal and Environmental Issues?Future Challenges 
for the Antarctic Treaty System, in ANTARCTICA: LEGAL AND ENVIRONMENT CHALLENGES FOR THE 
FUTURE 1, 3 (Gillian Triggs & Anna Riddell eds., 2007). 
191 Christos L. Rozakis, Compromises of States Interests and Their Repercussions Upon the Rules on 
the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, in THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 155, 165 (Christos L. Rozakis 
& Constatine A. Stephanou eds., 1983). 
192 SAHURIE, supra note 1544, at 387. 
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The goal was to li????????????????????????????????????????????????????????193 
and to support the interest of the least developed states to participate in 
deep-sea resources.194  The Law of the Sea was partly negotiated in reaction 
???????????????????????????????????????????????hip entails the rejection of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and technologically advanced states.195  
The negotiations on how to distribute sea-bed resources were 
driven by familiar land-based concerns.  Mineral-exporting developing 
nations were very worried about a loss of export earnings, due to a fall in 
price from minerals extracted in deep sea areas instead of purchased from 
them.196  In negotiating the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (?UNCLOS?), such mineral-exporting nations were joined by other 
developing countries in an expression of solidarity.197  Nepal and other 
landlocked states proposed a Common Heritage Fund drawn from profits 
on exploitations of the Exclusive Economic Zone; however, this proposal 
was not adopted.198  As a result, UNCLOS arranges production by an 
annual ceiling, and gives the International Sea-???????????????????????? ???
come to the aid of developing countries whose economies would be 
seriously harmed by activities in the Area.?199  UNCLOS??? ???????? ?? 
provides for payments from state to state arising from economic 
exploitation in the high seas: 
 
The coastal Slate shall make payments or contributions in 
kind in respect of the exploitation of the non-living 
resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured.200 
                                                 
193 Rozakis, supra note 1911, at 166. 
194 Id. at 167. 
195 Rene-Jean Dupuy, The Notion of Common Heritage of Mankind Applied to the Seabed, in THE NEW 
LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 1911, at 199, 201. Sahurie, writing in 1992, appears incredulous:   
[s]mall states could not have realistically hoped for a new international economic 
????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
they are unable to exploit by themselves; nor can they hope to share the gains in 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
financial capabilities. 
But that is exactly what they hoped for. SAHURIE, supra note 1544, at 371. 
196 Dupuy, supra note 195, at 205.  
197 Constantine A Stephanou, A European Perception of the Attitude of the United States at the F inal 
Stages of UNCLOS III With Respect to the Exploitation of the Deep Sea-Bed, in THE NEW LAW OF THE 
SEA, supra note 191, at 259, 260. 
198 DONALD R. ROTHWELL & TIM STEPHENS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 201 (2010). 
199 Stephanou, supra note 197, at 261.  
200 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 82(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 (1982) (Payments and contributions with respect to the exploitation of the continental 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles). 
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The Convention specifies the amount of contribution: 
 
The payments and contributions shall be made annually 
with respect to all production at a site after the first five 
years of production at that site.  For the sixth year, the rate 
of payment or contribution shall be 1 per cent of the value 
or volume of production at the site.  The rate shall increase 
by 1 per cent for each subsequent year until the twelfth 
year and shall remain at 7 per cent thereafter.  Production 
does not include resources used in connection with 
exploitation.201 
 
The method of sharing these contributions is left to equity, 
interests, and needs: 
 
The payments or contributions shall be made through the 
Authority, which shall distribute them to States Parties to 
this Convention, on the basis of equitable sharing criteria, 
taking into account the interests and needs of developing 
States, particularly the least developed and the land-locked 
among them.202 
 
 Not only does UNCLOS provide for benefits sharing, but it creates 
a multinational company called the Enterprise in order to engage in deep 
seabed mining.  It requires transfer to the Enterprise  
 
on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions, 
the technology that is owned by him or which he is entitled 
to use by virtue of a license.  In the event of his not being 
authorised to grant sub-licenses, he undertakes to obtain 
this right . . . .  It should, furthermore, be noted here that 
penalties and forfeitures are provided for, in case the 
contractor refuses to carry out the above mentioned 
commitments.203 
 
                                                 
201 Id. art. 82(2). 
202 Id. art. 82(4). 
203 Stephanou, supra note 197, at 264. 
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The Nixon administration agreed to such compromises under 
pressure from the Department of Defense to protect US Navy access to 
international straits:  
 
The Department of Defense assessed the price of securing 
naval mobility to be concessions on the deep-seabed 
interests of the Third World . . . .  The deep seabed was 
seen as a bargaining chip that would facilitate a quid pro 
quo between the maritime powers and the Third World.204  
 
????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????
provide a precedent for peacefully and cooperatively dealing with common 
???????????????????????????????????205   
This compromise was too much for the Reagan administration, 
which valued coastal interests such as fishing and oil drilling above all.206  
Even though all the changes requested by the Reagan administration 
(having to do with technology transfer and a U.S. veto power) were 
negotiated and signed by most states in 1994, the U.S. still has not signed 
UNCLOS.207  Just as developing nations were rejecting the exclusive nature 
of the Antarctic Treaty System, the United States thought that UNCLOS 
?????????????????????? ?????????????????? ???????????? ?????? ???? ?????????? ????
Antarctica and for outer space.208 
 
E . More than one governing principle 
 
1. Kyoto Protocol 
 
The Kyoto Protocol was opened for signature in December 1997, 
and came into force in 2005.  As of January 2009, 184 countries had 
ratified the Protocol.209  It was the culmination of negotiations that began 
with a World Climate Conference in 1979.210  Kyoto articulates the 
?????????? ??? ???????? ???? ??????????????? ???????????????? ???? ?????? ?????
?????????? ?????? ??? ??????????? ?????????? ?hould be given full 
                                                 
204 STEVEN R. DAVID & PETER DIGESER, THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA TREATY 15 
(1990).  
205 See id. at 26. 
206 See id. at 10-12. 
207 SCOTT G. BORGERSON, THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 11-12 (2009). 
208 SAHURIE, supra note 1544, at 389. 
209 See UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol Status of Ratification, Jan. 14, 2009, http://unfccc.int/files/ 
kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification /application/pdf/kp_ ratification.pdf. 
210 See HEIKI SCHRODER, NEGOTIATING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: AN ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATION 
DYNAMICS IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS 14 (2001). 
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???????????????211  It reflected the dual governing principles of reducing 
future harm and compensating developing countries for the vulnerability to 
which ???????????????????? emissions had subjected them.212  Building on 
these guiding principles, the Kyoto Protocol operates by requiring certain 
countries to reduce their emissions, and articulates the mechanisms of 
doing so.  
The manifestation of the common but differentiated responsibilities 
is the requirement that the thirty-nine developed countries listed in Annex I 
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by at least five percent below 1990 
levels.213  The categories of Annex I and non-Annex I acknowledge 
accountability for harmful emissions in the past rather than the ability to 
reduce future world emissions.  ???? ??????? ?? ????? ????????? ???????
countries, the non-Annex I list ??????????????????????????214 and the relative 
contributions of each category moves closer to each other every year.  The 
categories reflect, therefore, a compensation motivation for distribution.      
The Kyoto Protocol also includes flexibility mechanisms to 
achieve emissions reductions, such as emissions trading (trading between 
developed countries); joint implementation (transferring emissions 
allowances between developed countries); and a Clean Development 
Mechanism ??????? (allowing participants to achieve part of their 
obligations through projects in developing countries).215  The flexibility 
mechanisms reflect a growing faith in market-based solutions for collective 
action problems?? ?????????? ????????? ??????????? ???? ??????? ?????????
rights.?216  The CDM, in particular, was a compromise in response to a 
                                                 
211 Id. at 21.  
212 Joyeeta Gupta, Developing Countries and the Post-Kyoto Regime: Breaking the Tragic Lock-in of 
?????????????????????????????????, in THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND BEYOND: LEGAL AND POLICY 
CHALLENGES OF CLIMATE CHANGE 161, 165 (W.Th. Douma et al. eds., 2007) (developing countries are 
less resilient to dangers from climate change). 
213 SCHRODER, supra note 210, at 64. Some countries had stronger targets.  The EU has to reduce by 
8%, the United States by 7 %, Japan by 6%. Id. There were other proposals that veered more strongly 
from the status quo.  See, e.g., MAYER HILLMAN ET AL., THE SUICIDAL PLANET: HOW TO PREVENT 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CATASTROPHE 194, 194 (2007) (advocating personal carbon allowances of equal 
carbon allocation for all people, with only rare exceptions). 
214 Gupta, supra note 212?????????????????????????????????????????????????prioritize, at least rhetorically, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id. at 165.  
215 Saleemul Huq & Hannah Reid, Benefit Sharing Under the Clean Development Mechanism, in LEGAL 
ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK 230 (David 
Freestone & Charlotte Streck, eds., 2005). 
216 Kysar, supra note 46, at 2116 (arguing that market liberalism and sustainable development are 
fundamentally in tension).  Despite this faith in market-based solutions, the Kyoto Protocol does not 
operate by means of the simplest and most robust market intervention?a carbon tax?even though 
experts believe that such a tax would be the most efficient carbon mitigation scheme.  See e.g., Reuven 
S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change: Why A Carbon Tax Is A 
Better Response To Global Warming Than Cap And Trade, PUB. L. & LEG. THEORY WORKING PAPER 
SERIES, WORKING PAPER NO. 117, March 2008 (Revised Jan. 2009) (discussing why a carbon tax is a 
better solution than a cap and trade system, due to simplicity, ease of enforcement, among other 
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Brazilian proposal for financial penalties for failure to meet Kyoto 
????????????? ?????????????????????? ????? ????? ??? ?? ????lty on governments 
??????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????217  
The negotiating challenges of Kyoto are hard to overstate.  In 
addition to the chilling effect of the lack of U.S. participation since 1997,218 
the challenges included consistent divisions between North and South 
negotiating blocs and among the G-77, such as divisions between low-lying 
states and oil-producing states.219 The preparation in developing countries 
???? ???????????? ????????? ???? ???????? ??? ????????????? ????????????? ???ir 
relative lack of scientific information . . ., the lack of public and political 
interest in climate change-related issues, and the inability to go beyond 
simple, rhetorical demands . . . .  This tends to lead to a hollow mandate for 
negotiating purposes??220  
The Kyoto Protocol i??????????????????????????????????? ??? ?????????
choices of national economic policy and the lifestyle of citizens . . . .  The 
???????? ????????? ??????? ??? ?????? ????????? ?? ?? ?? ??? ??????????221  In an 
effort to match the complexity of causation with flexible solutions, it 
facilitates reductions and sequestration at the lowest cost, in a framework 
imported from the American experience in acid rain permit trading.222  
Earlier international environmental law frameworks imported liability 
models, based on the loss of ability to exploit transboundary resources,223 
or models based on principles of nuisance.224  Multilateral frameworks 
employed rules to reduce harm, either by mandating technological 
improvements, in the case of the move to double-hulled tankers, or by 
combining this mandate with assistance to developing countries, in the case 
                                                                                                                 
factors).  This faith in market-based solutions is in contrast to attempts not long before to address 
developing country vulnerabilities through price floors and other protections.  See John Ravenhill, What 
is to be done for Third World commodity exporters? An evaluation of the STABEX scheme, 38 INT?L 
ORG. 537, 538 (1984) (discussing how negotiations on protecting non-oil exporting Third World 
countries moved from price-setting mechanisms to a compensatory financing scheme).   
217 SCHRODER, supra note 2110, at 71. 
218 Gupta, supra note 2122, at 161. 
219 CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW, supra note 20, at 135. 
220 Id. at 163.  Other negotiating challenges included: debates on free market promotion versus 
environmental restraints on production; different treaties and bodies on climate change, some with 
conflicting goals; multilateral negotiations and unilateral negotiations initiated by the United States, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????-????????????????????????????????????????
coalitions within the developing world.  Id.  
221 Michael Bothe, The Kyoto Protocol as a Pioneer Among the Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements, in THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND BEYOND: LEGAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE 241, 242 (W.Th. Douma et al. eds., 2007). 
222 Id. at 244. 
223 Thomas A. Reynolds, Delimitation, Exploitation, And Allocation Of Transboundary Oil & Gas 
Deposits Between Nation-States, 1 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 135, 164 (1995).  
224 See Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1963-81 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1941) (on 
cross-border pollution arising in a Canadian smelter).  
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of the Montreal Protocol on CFCs.225  The Kyoto Protocol reflects both the 
principle of compensation for past wrongs, as well as a finely granulated 
model to invest in global climate protection.   
 
I I I . Patterns of Distribution in International Law 
 
 Despite the charge that distribution between nations is not a 
strength of international law, global frameworks distribute resources in 
powerful, albeit unnoticed, ways.  The success of this distribution depends 
not on the topic at hand, but on the motivating principle behind the 
distributive framework.  Distribution based on the principles of 
compensation for past harm or investment in public goods is time-tested 
and uncontroversial.  Distribution based on necessity is a newer entrant to 
the field, but succeeds due to moral force.  Despite decades of pressure and 
a variety of attempts, the common heritage of mankind has been rejected as 
an organizing principle of distribution in international law, although states 
appear to respect it in practice, at least for low-value resources.   
 As the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal demonstrates, the norm of 
compensation for harm to private property is sufficiently well established 
to undergird distribution of resources even between the most ardent 
enemies.  The measure of liability is hotly contested, as is the relative 
ability of a country to change protections for private property within its 
borders.  Even as the measure of damages or attribution of liability 
changes, nations feel confident asking for and expecting compensation for 
harm to private property.  
 Less well known than compensation, and yet more powerfully 
integrated into the globalized economy, are distribution frameworks that 
invest in global public goods.  Whether keeping the mail moving or 
stopping the flow of small arms, international law effectively distributes 
resources in order to achieve a specific, shared goal.  In these frameworks 
there is a clear need on the part of developed countries, and little discussion 
of the question of liability.  The debate is purely one of how to achieve a 
simple goal rather than one of corrective justice, and classifications based 
on considerations of anything other than effectiveness muddy the clarity of 
the investment motivation.  
 Distribution based on necessity is a new facet of the distributional 
function of international law.  Distinct from charity, such as the outpouring 
of support that might follow a natural disaster, international law distributes 
                                                 
225 The Montreal Protocol on CFCs included a Multilateral Fund for ozone depletion which 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
depleting substances . . . To date, about $1 billion has been committed to projects to cut ozone-depleting 
??????????????VICTOR, supra note 11, at 37. 
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the outcome of requests (or demands) for commitments to remedy an unfair 
status quo.  The campaign for sovereign debt relief demonstrates that the 
ability to alleviate suffering motivates distribution, as long as a precise and 
powerful campaign can engage domestic constituencies.  A similar 
campaign for access to essential medicines has had a modest impact to 
date, as the principle of necessity resulted in the redistribution of 
intellectual property rights and revenue to developing countries through an 
international legal framework.226  
 The concept of common ownership, or the common heritage of 
mankind, emerged in the Cold War era when developing countries were 
flexing new-found power.  They sought to corral previously unclaimed 
resources in space, the moon, the high seas, and Antarctica.  This effort has 
been roundly rejected by the nations that are currently able to exploit 
opportunities in these new frontiers.  The Outer Space Treaty, signed by 
over a hundred countries, aims to preclude claims of sovereignty and 
requires that activities in outer space be organized for the common benefit 
and interest of all.  The Moon Treaty, ratified by thirteen non-spacefaring 
nations, calls for the equitable sharing of resources based on the common 
heritage of mankind.  Although the parties to the Antarctic Treaty System 
worked for years to fend off pressure to organize the Antarctic under 
common ownership, when pressed, they shelved a framework that would 
have allowed for mining in the Antarctic.  The ardent exposition of the 
common heritage of mankind finally drew the United States out of the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.  However, the United States, along with 
the United Kingdom, Russia, Germany, France, and Italy, provided for 
some percentage of deep sea mining revenues to be shared with developing 
nations.227  This forbearance may be tested as resources in new frontiers 
become more valuable.228   
 International law distributes resources for compensation as an 
investment in public goods and due to necessity, while it founders with 
frameworks that draw on the common heritage of mankind or on more than 
one norm.  Arguably, the Kyoto Protocol could have been justified as 
compensation for past harm, given the incontrovertible responsibility of 
developed nations for cumulative greenhouse gas emissions.  It could also 
have been explained as an investment in a global public good, given the 
                                                 
226 See generally Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of 
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. ?????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
traditional intellectual property system).  
227 See BASLAR, supra note 1522??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ied at 
30 U.S.C. § 1472 (2006).   
228 The common heritage of the seas was never tested, as deep sea mining never became profitable. In 
comparison, revenue from fishing on the high seas has never been shared through some sort of equitable 
mechanism.  
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shared reliance on the ecological status quo.  However, Kyoto combined 
differential responsibilities based on past contribution with a variety of 
efficiency mechanisms based on a shared investment framework.  
???????????????? ???????? ?? ?????????? ??????????????? ?????? ???? ?????????? ???
liability and its ability to invest in a shared goal?in the case of China?or 
between its responsibility and its vulnerability to the chaos caused by such 
greenhouse gases?in the case of the United States?drove a wedge 
through the Kyoto Protocol.229  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The breadth of areas for which international law redistributes 
resources should put to rest the q???????? ??????????? ?[w]e should rarely 
observe treaties that redistribute wealth from one state to another??230  
Indeed, we frequently observe treaties of this nature.  By offering a 
description of the state of distribution in international law, this Article has 
attempted to counter the presumption that such distribution does not 
happen.  In addition, this Article posits an explanation of why distribution 
occurs without contest in some areas, and only in the face of great 
opposition in others.  It aims to help international law practitioners 
understand the implications of the way that distributive frameworks are 
designed on the likely success of the treaty, particularly in terms of 
motivating principles.  
 One lesson of this survey of distribution in international law is that 
models of distribution oriented towards one goal are judged by what they 
mean for distribution in general.  Developing countries hoped that the 
Moon Treaty would be a template for a massive distribution of wealth, and 
the United States worried about what the Law of the Sea meant as 
precedent for Antarctica, outer space, and the moon.  In reacting so 
strongly against distribution based on the common heritage of mankind, the 
United States operated under the assumption that distribution under 
international law was possible and the United States needed to be protected 
from what it ????????????????????????????????? 
 Another lesson from this survey is that distributive frameworks 
learn from each other.  The Antarctic Treaty System responded with 
apprehension to the movement towards a common heritage of mankind 
expressed in the Law of the Sea.  The Moon Treaty tried to overcome the 
lack of recognition of the common heritage of mankind in both the Outer 
                                                 
229 See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 22, at 1567-68 (analyzing climate change through a lens of 
corrective and distributional justice). 
230 Posner, supra note 9.  
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Space treaty and the Antarctica Treaties.  The CBD and the Seed Treaty 
rejected the notion of common heritage, focusing instead on common 
opportunity, and the Seed Treaty avoided the bilateral arrangements of the 
CBD.  Far from being a rare occurrence, distribution under international 
law is indispensible to the practical and moral fabric of a globalized world.  
As long as the call for distribution justifies itself by one principle of 
compensation, investment, or necessity, it can be expected to do the work 
of international law in maintaining the world public order. 
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